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Recent Developments
LIMITING DEATH: MARYLAND’S NEW DEATH PENALTY LAW
MICHAEL MILLEMANN*
I. INTRODUCTION
In this Article, I describe and analyze the State of Maryland’s
2009 death penalty law.1  This law adds three new death-eligibility cri-
teria to the pre-existing law.  These new evidentiary criteria supple-
ment the pre-existing substantive death-eligibility criteria.2  As a result,
Maryland now has one of the most restrictive death penalties in the
country.3
In Part II, I review the legislative history of the new law, including
debates on the bill in the Maryland Senate and House of Delegates.
The new law was developed on the Senate floor through amendments
to an abolition bill.  I present and quote from the debates because the
bill’s history is an important part of understanding the law.4  The de-
bates will be relevant in future litigation.5
In Part III, I describe how the new law and the pre-existing law fit
together and how a new Maryland Rule integrates the two.6  The new
Rule divides the capital trial into three phrases: the determination of
guilt or innocence, the determination of death-eligibility, and sen-
Copyright  2010 by Michael A. Millemann.
* Michael A. Millemann is the Jacob A. France Professor of Public Interest Law at the
University of Maryland School of Law.
1. MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 2-202(a)(3), (c) (LexisNexis 2002 & Supp. 2010).
2. See infra Part III.
3. Elaine de Leon, Money, Morality, and Repealing the Death Penalty, PBS.ORG (Apr. 24,
2009), http://www.pbs.org/wnet/religionandethics/episodes/april-24-2009/money-mo-
rality-and-repealing-the-death-penalty/2757/ (“Maryland lawmakers amended the repeal
bill and decided instead to make the state’s death penalty statute among the most restric-
tive in the nation.”).
4. But see Brian G. Slocum, The Importance of Being Ambiguous: Substantive Canons, Stare
Decisis, and the Central Role of Ambiguity Determinations in the Administrative State, 69 MD. L.
REV. 791, 824 (2010) (“Some scholars have argued, however, that . . . consideration of
legislative history is, at best, not probative, and, at worst, has a negative probative value.”).
5. See Robert Weisberg, Deregulating Death, 1983 SUP. CT. REV. 305, 308 (describing the
“problem of capital punishment” as a subject for legal rules and noting that “a judge or
jury’s decision to kill is an intensely moral, subjective matter that seems to defy the design-
ers of general formulas for legal decision”).
6. See infra Part III.A.
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tencing.7  I discuss the effects of this trifurcation, which, in my view,
are mostly good.
In Part IV, I assess the new law.  With the help of a recent trial
court decision, I analyze the new law’s key provisions.8  Despite using
this case as a helpful supplement, my analysis remains very prelimi-
nary.  Subsequent cases, with the advantage of evidentiary hearings,
fact-specific challenges, and briefing on the issues, will better identify
and define the most important legal issues.  There are a number of
provisions in the new law that trial courts and eventually the Maryland
Court of Appeals will be required to interpret.  I identify three poten-
tial issues: (1) what the State is required to prove to establish the
death-eligibility criteria (I argue that the State must establish the fact-
based criteria by the well-accepted standard of proof beyond a reason-
able doubt); (2) whether the three new death-eligibility criteria are
unconstitutionally vague (I offer interpretations to narrow and clarify
key provisions and respond to potential vagueness challenges); and
(3) whether the law is unconstitutionally arbitrary (I identify ways in
which the new law logically restricts the death penalty but acknowl-
edge the counterarguments).9
II. THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF MARYLAND’S NEW DEATH PENALTY
LAW
In January 2009, the President of the Maryland Senate Thomas V.
Mike Miller Jr., acting at the request of Governor Martin O’Malley
and joined by a number of other Senators,10 introduced a bill that
would have abolished the Maryland death penalty.11  Senate Bill 279
came to the General Assembly with considerable momentum amid
speculation that, for the first time since the re-enactment of the Mary-
7. See infra Part III.B.
8. See infra Part IV.
9. See infra Part IV.B.1–3.
10. The bill was sponsored by Senators Currie, Exum, Frosh, Gladden, Jones, Kelley,
King, Lenett, Madaleno, McFadden, Muse, Peters, Pinsky, Pugh, and Raskin.  S. B. 279,
426th Sess. (Md. 2009).
11. See id.; see also Richard Lacayo, The Tide Shifts Against the Death Penalty, TIME, Feb. 3,
2009, http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1876397,00.html (“After years of
failed attempts by death penalty opponents to bring a repeal bill to a vote in the state
legislature, Maryland Governor Martin O’Malley is personally sponsoring this year’s ver-
sion, promising that he will fight to have the legislature pass it during the . . . 90-day
session.”).
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land death penalty in 1978, there was a real chance that the General
Assembly would abolish capital punishment.12
The 2008 Maryland Commission on Capital Punishment, chaired
by Benjamin Civiletti, a former U.S. Attorney General and senior part-
ner at Venable LLP, issued a Final Report that supplied some of the
momentum.  The Governor, the President of the Senate, and the
Speaker of the House of Delegates jointly selected Civiletti as Commis-
sion Chairman.13  In the Report, the Commission recommended that
the death penalty be abolished.14  The Commission considered testi-
mony presented at five public hearings by national and local experts
and by Maryland citizens and evaluated this testimony and supple-
mental facts at five additional meetings.15  In its Final Report, the
Commission stated that “[t]he costs of capital cases far exceed the
costs of cases in which the death penalty is not sought.”16  Further-
more, according to the Commission, criminal justice “resources could
be better used elsewhere,” such as for homicide prevention.17  The
Commission expressed concerns about both surviving family members
and wrongly convicted defendants, stating that “[t]he effects of pro-
longed capital cases take an unnecessary toll on the family members
of victims”18 and noting that “[t]he risk of executing an innocent per-
12. See Steve Lash, Death Penalty, Police Surveillance Among Laws in Play This Session in
Maryland, DAILY RECORD (Md.), Jan. 12, 2009; John Wagner, Move May Aid Death Penalty
Repeal Bill, WASH. POST, Jan. 29, 2009, at B1.
13. MD. COMM’N ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, FINAL REPORT TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY 4
(2008), available at http://www.goccp.maryland.gov/capital-punishment/documents/
death-penalty-commission-final-report.pdf.
14. Id. at 23.
15. Id. at 7.
16. Id. at 23.  The Commission said:
The cost of pursuing a capital case is estimated conservatively to be at least
three times the cost of a non-death penalty homicide prosecution ($1.1 to $2.9
million).  The cost studies are based on opportunity costs and not out-of-pocket
expenses.  Nevertheless, the direct savings calculated from 1978 to 1999 would
amount to $186 million dollars, which is the value of the resources that could be
used for other purposes by members of the criminal justice system.
Id. at 15 (footnote omitted).
17. Id. at 23; see also David B. Wilkins, Identities and Roles: Race, Recognition, and Profes-
sional Responsibility, 57 MD. L. REV. 1502, 1578 (1998) (commenting that many prosecutors
agreed that “death [penalty] cases [we]re not an efficient use of the office’s resources”).
18. MD. COMM’N ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, supra note 13, at 23.  The Commission said: R
Many witnesses testified about the grief, and heartbreak that the capital pun-
ishment process causes for family members of victims.  The significant amount of
time offenders remain on Death Row and their lengthy appeals process perpetu-
ates the injury, grief and heartbreak to the families of victims.  They are forced to
relive the tragedy of the crime and re-experience its trauma.  While a convicted
felon who receives the sentence of life without parole goes directly to prison to
serve this sentence, a convicted felon who receives a death sentence goes to Death
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son is . . . a real possibility.”19  The Commission pointed out that “ra-
cial and jurisdictional bias” undermines the fairness of capital
punishment in Maryland.20  The Commission also marshaled data
showing that the death penalty, in fact, has no deterrent effect and
Row and waits, often several decades before the sentence is carried out and the
person is executed.  Some family members of victims are embittered by the per-
ceived failure of the system to carry out the sentence.  As a result, many members
of the families of victims oppose the death penalty as serving no useful purpose
and instead causing societal harm.
Id. at 16.
19. Id. at 23.  The Commission observed that “[o]ne of our own Commissioners, Kirk
Bloodsworth, spent two years on Death Row and nearly nine total in prison for a crime he
did not commit” before “[h]e was finally exonerated by DNA evidence.” Id.  Mr. Blood-
sworth’s wrongful sentence was, the Commission said, consistent with national data dem-
onstrating that “130 Death Row prisoners have been exonerated.” Id.  The Commission
added:
New DNA laws do not completely eliminate the risk of other innocent people
being wrongfully convicted and sent to Death Row, the way that Commissioner
Bloodsworth was. . . .  [I]n many cases, DNA evidence is not available and, even
when it is available, it is subject to contamination or error at the scene of the
offense or in the laboratory.
Id. at 23–24.  The Commission quantified the high risk of error in capital cases by noting
that “for every 8.7 executions [nationally], there has been one exoneration.” Id. at 18.
20. Id. at 24.  With respect to race, the Commission said:
Between 1979 and 1999, there were 1,311 death-eligible cases in Maryland,
resulting in five executions and five persons remaining on Death Row today—in
other words, an execution rate of less than one-half of one percent (<.5%).  The
evidence show[ed] that . . . race play[ed] a dominant role in the administration
of the death penalty in Maryland.  Research presented to the Commission showed
that cases in which an African-American offender killed a Caucasian victim [we]re
almost two and a half times more likely to have death imposed than in cases
where a Caucasian offender killed a Caucasian victim.  Race play[ed] such a sig-
nificant role that it overshadow[ed] several of the statutorily required factors in
Maryland’s system of guided discretion.  The worst or most serious cases thus
d[id] not necessarily receive the most severe sanction of execution.
Id. at 10 (footnotes omitted).  The Commission “f[ound] that the administration of the
death penalty clearly show[ed] racial bias and that no procedural or administrative
changes to the processing of capital cases would eliminate these racial disparities.” Id. at
11.  Jurisdictional bias was as acute.  The Commission found “that the chances of a State’s
Attorney seeking and imposing a death sentence differ[ed] alarmingly across jurisdictions
in Maryland, even when the cases [we]re similar.” Id. at 12.  For example, “the probability
of a State’s Attorney seeking death [wa]s over thirteen times higher in Baltimore County
than it [wa]s in Baltimore City in similar cases.” Id.  More troublesome, according to the
statistics, “the probability of receiving a death sentence in Baltimore County [wa]s almost
twenty-three times higher than the probability of receiving a death sentence for a similar
crime in Baltimore City.” Id. (emphasis added).  Moreover, “jurisdictional disparities were
not limited to these two counties. . . .  Baltimore County cases [we]re five times more likely
to have death requested than Montgomery County cases. . . .  Harford County cases were
eleven times more likely than Baltimore City cases to have death requested.” Id. (footnotes
and internal quotation marks omitted).
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does not prevent homicides.21  The Commission concluded that Mary-
land’s death penalty process is “arbitrary and capricious” and “neither
fair nor accurate.”22
The Commission’s Report provided an initial reason to believe
that the General Assembly might abolish capital punishment.  The
strong, forceful advocacy of Governor O’Malley in opposition to the
death penalty provided another reason to be optimistic that the Gen-
eral Assembly might abolish capital punishment.23
Upon introduction, Senate Bill 279 was referred to the Senate
Judicial Proceedings Committee.24  On February 27, 2009, the Com-
mittee gave the bill an unfavorable committee report by a vote of six
to five.25  On March 3, 2009, however, the Senate adopted a motion to
substitute Senate Bill 279 for the unfavorable committee report.26
21. Id. at 22.  The Commission said that it was “convinced by the strong consensus
among respected social scientists that sound research d[id] not support the proposition
that capital punishment deters murders.” Id.  The Commission continued:
The idea that capital punishment could deter homicides assumes murderers
would rationally choose not to kill in order to avoid execution.  The evidence
presented showed that many murders [we]re crimes of passion, often impulsive,
frequently committed by dysfunctional persons with serious emotional or mental
disorders or acting under the influence of drugs or alcohol.  Furthermore, in view
of the fact that executions [we]re so rare—less than one half of one percent
(<.5%) of homicides result in a sentence of death—a rational offender would
deduce a 99.5% likelihood of avoiding execution for murder, a figure unlikely to
deter.
Id.
22. Id. at 23.
23. See, e.g., Julie Bykowicz, Vote Urged on Death Penalty: O’Malley Calls on Committee to
Move Repeal Bill to Floor for Full Senate Action, BALT. SUN, Feb. 19, 2009, at 3A (noting that
Governor O’Malley urged lawmakers “to consider both ‘empirical evidence’ and ‘higher
truths’ when making their decision” on the repeal bill); Michael Drost, O’Malley Marches
Against Death Penalty, WASH. TIMES, Feb. 26, 2009, at A1 (describing O’Malley’s “emotional,
all-out effort . . . to repeal the 30-year-old death penalty after years of defeat in the state
Senate”); John Wagner, O’Malley Goes All-Out for Death Penalty Repeal, WASH. POST, Mar. 3,
2009, at B1 (explaining that O’Malley “flooded supporters with e-mail, phoned and met
with wavering senators” in the days prior to the Senate vote). See generally ALAN ROSENTHAL,
ENGINES OF DEMOCRACY: POLITICS & POLICYMAKING IN STATE LEGISLATURES 265–67 (2009)
(describing O’Malley’s influence “in setting . . . the agenda for policies and programs that
may potentially become law”).
24. 1 MARYLAND SENATE JOURNAL, 426th Sess. 258–59 (2009).
25. 7 MARYLAND SENATE JOURNAL 943.  Senators Brochin, Haines, Jacobs, Mooney,
Simonaire, and Stone voted against the bill. Id. Senators Frosh, Gladden, Forehand,
Muse, and Raskin voted in favor of the bill. Id.; see also John Wagner, Death Penalty Debate
Likely Still on Despite Panel, WASH. POST, Feb. 28, 2009, at B3 (noting that the committee’s
unfavorable report “was seen as a setback for O’Malley”).
26. 2 MARYLAND SENATE JOURNAL 1101; see also Julie Bykowicz & Gadi Dechter, Chaos in
the Senate: Lawmakers Turn Away Repeal of Death Penalty, Debate to Resume Today, BALT. SUN,
Mar. 4, 2009, at 1A (noting that “death penalty opponents used a rare procedural move to
resurrect repeal legislation” and explaining that “[t]he motion does not appear in the
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Through this mechanism, the bill was presented to the Senate, on the
Senate floor, in its original form.27
Later that day, after approval of the motion to substitute, Sena-
tors James Brochin and Robert A. Zirkin offered floor amendments to
Senate Bill 279, which were each adopted by the Senate.28  These
amendments fundamentally changed the nature of Senate Bill 279 by
substituting radical restrictions to the death penalty for abolition.
Senator Brochin’s amendment maintained the death penalty, but
his amendment provided that “[a] defendant may not be sentenced to
death, but shall be sentenced to imprisonment for life without the
possibility of parole . . . if the State relies solely on evidence provided
by eyewitnesses.”29  According to Brochin, Maryland’s statute was al-
ready “very good,” but his amendment would make it “a little bit bet-
Senate rule book”).  The motion passed by a vote of twenty-five to twenty-two.  2 MARYLAND
SENATE JOURNAL 1101.  In 1978, proponents of the death penalty used this procedure to
bring to the Senate floor a bill that reinstated the death penalty in Maryland after the 1978
Senate Committee on Judicial Proceedings had given it an unfavorable report.  The Senate
President said this procedure “is the way” the reinstatement bill “came to the floor thirty
years ago, and this is the way that” Senate Bill 279 “is going to be on the floor today.”
Audio file: Proceedings on S.B. 279, Maryland State Senate at 12:55–13:01 (Mar. 3, 2009,
Sess. No. 1) [hereinafter Senate Proceedings on S.B. 279, Mar. 3, Sess. No. 1] (on file with
the Maryland Law Review).  It is clear, however, that the Senate President was not happy
with this procedure.  He said: “This procedure hasn’t been done in thirty years, thirty
years, thirty years; it hasn’t been done since February 1978 . . . and from this day on we are
not going to do it again, hopefully, as long as I am up here.” Id. at 11:58–12:14.  The
Senate President identified both the source of the procedure and the special reason he was
allowing it:
Since this motion is not in the rules, we look to Mason’s Manual. Mason’s Man-
ual . . . advises that one source of rule for legislative procedure is custom, usage
and precedence.  As I have stated before, there is precedence in the history of the
Senate for this motion being made.  The last time it was made was in February
1978 with regard to this exact same subject matter.  And, that is the reason for this
unique ruling from the Chair.
Id. at 28:25–28:51; see also id. at 17:28–17:56 (statements of Sen. Lisa Gladden, lead sponsor
of S.B. 279) (describing how the motion to substitute was used in 1978 to bring the death
penalty reinstatement bill to the Senate floor over an unfavorable report from the Senate
Judicial Proceedings Committee); id. at 19:35–19:44 (“If indeed we brought the death pen-
alty to the State of Maryland by way of a substitute motion, why . . . can we not repeal that
in the same way?”).
27. The motion was made by Senator Gladden, a sponsor of the repeal bill. 2 MARY-
LAND SENATE JOURNAL 1101.
28. Id. at 1116–19; see also Bykowicz & Dechter, supra note 26 (explaining how “two R
Democratic Senators . . . changed the nature of the death penalty debate, quickly silencing
discussion of repeal”).
29. 2 MARYLAND SENATE JOURNAL 1117 (statement of Sen. Brochin concerning floor
amendment no. 703826/2 (adopted Mar. 3, 2009)).
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ter.”30  Brochin explained the motivation behind his amendment—
stating that he was “troubled” by “the Kirk Bloodsworth case” in which
a court convicted and sentenced to death an innocent, and now exon-
erated, defendant based largely on eyewitness testimony.31  According
to Brochin, his amendment would help prevent a similar miscarriage
of justice.32
Senator Zirkin’s amendment added three major evidentiary re-
strictions to the death penalty, making its application likely only in a
small number of cases.  Under this amendment, a capital defendant
would not be eligible for the death penalty unless the State presented:
(1) “biological evidence or DNA evidence that link[ed] the defendant
to the act of murder”; (2) “a video taped, voluntary interrogation and
confession of the defendant to the murder”; or (3) “a video recording
that conclusively link[ed] the defendant to the murder.”33  Senator
Zirkin stated that the goal of his amendment was to “create a barrier”
to the death penalty in all cases in which prosecutors could not pro-
duce “more reliable evidence.”34  The amendment’s first category of
“more reliable evidence”—biological or DNA evidence—was, accord-
ing to Zirkin, defined in the statute.35  He was apparently referring to
the Maryland DNA Act, which defines “DNA” and “[b]iological evi-
dence.”36  According to Zirkin, his amendment would make the death
penalty “much more strict and much tighter.”37
The Zirkin amendment apparently made the Brochin amend-
ment unnecessary.  In response to a question from the floor about the
interplay of the Brochin and Zirkin amendments, the Senate Presi-
dent said that the Brochin amendment “d[id] no harm” to the Zirkin
amendment but would become “meaningless” if the Senate enacted
the latter.38  The Senate President pointed out that under the amend-
ment there could not be a death penalty sentence based solely on
30. Audio file: Proceedings on S.B. 279, Maryland State Senate at 12:10–12:19 (Mar. 3,
2009, Sess. No. 2) [hereinafter Senate Proceedings on S.B. 279, Mar. 3, Sess. No. 2] (on file
with the Maryland Law Review).
31. Id. at 12:18–12:30.
32. Id. at 12:30–12:55.
33. 2 MARYLAND SENATE JOURNAL 1119 (statement of Sen. Zirkin concerning floor
amendment no. 553820/3 (adopted Mar. 3, 2009)).
34. Senate Proceedings on S.B. 279, Mar. 3, Sess. No. 2, supra note 30, at 19:45–20:04. R
35. Id. at 20:16–20:20.
36. MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 8-201(a)(2)–(3) (LexisNexis 2008 & Supp. 2010)
(defining “[b]iological evidence” as including “any blood, hair, saliva, semen, epithelial
cells, buccal cells, or other bodily substances from which genetic marker groupings may be
obtained” and “DNA” as “deoxyribonucleic acid”).
37. Senate Proceedings on S.B. 279, Mar. 3, Sess. No. 2, supra note 30, at 21:15–21:23. R
38. Id. at 31:35–33:00.
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eyewitness testimony; the State would be required to establish one of
the three forms of noneyewitness evidence listed in the amendment.39
Senators who addressed the issue agreed with President Miller.40  Ac-
cording to Senator Frosh, the Brochin amendment precluded a death
sentence based solely on eyewitness testimony, while the Zirkin
amendment identified the kinds of noneyewitness testimony that
would be required to make defendants death-eligible.41  Under this
interpretation, the Brochin amendment could be viewed as a sort of
preamble to the Zirkin amendment.
Within one hour, the Senate voted to adopt the Brochin amend-
ment by a two vote margin (twenty-four to twenty-two),42 voted to
adopt the Zirkin amendment by a fifteen vote margin (thirty-five to
ten),43 and defeated a motion to recommit Senate Bill 279 to the Sen-
ate Judicial Proceedings Committee by a tie vote (twenty-three to
twenty-three).44  On March 5, 2009, the Senate passed the amended
bill by a vote of thirty-four to thirteen.45
On March 21, 2009, the House Judiciary Committee gave the bill
a favorable report (fourteen to seven).46  When the bill reached the
floor of the House of Delegates, ten delegates offered a total of four-
teen amendments.  Understanding that amending the bill was tanta-
mount to killing it,47 the House rejected the amendments (one was
withdrawn)48 and passed the bill by a vote of eighty-seven to fifty-two.49
On May 7, 2009, the Governor signed the bill.50
The proposed, but rejected, amendments provide evidence of the
House’s intent in adopting Senate Bill 279.51  The House sought to
39. Id. at 31:35–34:26.
40. See, e.g., id. at 32:26–32:30 (statements of Sen. Pres. Miller) (opining that the Zirkin
amendment makes the Brochin amendment “a nullity”).
41. Id. at 33:30–34:15.
42. 5 MARYLAND SENATE JOURNAL, 426th Sess. 242 (2009).
43. Id. at 243.
44. Id. at 244.  A second motion to recommit that was made on March 5, 2009 was
defeated by a vote of fifteen to thirty-two. Id. at 263.
45. Id. at 265.
46. 2 MARYLAND HOUSE JOURNAL, 426th Sess. 1744–45 (2009).
47. See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., Vetogates, Chevron, Preemption, 83 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 1441, 1445 (2008) (“On the floor of the House, a proposed bill faces new chal-
lenges.  The most common challenge is that opponents will propose amendments that
either weaken the bill or strengthen it so much that the bill will lose its majority support
(‘killer amendments’).”).
48. 2 MARYLAND HOUSE JOURNAL 1802–06 (amendments offered on Mar. 22, 2009); 3
MARYLAND HOUSE JOURNAL 1927–31 (amendments offered on Mar. 26, 2009).
49. 3 MARYLAND HOUSE JOURNAL 1931.
50. 2009 Md. Laws 1063–88.
51. See Jack Schwartz & Amanda Stakem Conn, The Court of Appeals at the Cocktail Party:
The Use and Misuse of Legislative History, 54 MD. L. REV. 432, 457–58 (1995) (explaining that
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preserve the restrictive rules of death-eligibility contained in Senate
Bill 279 as an alternative to abolition.  The House therefore rejected
amendments to exempt particular types of murders from the en-
hanced evidentiary requirements including contract murder,52
murder of a law enforcement officer with his own gun,53 mur-
der to further an act of terrorism,54 murder of a correctional
officer,55 and murder by a prisoner.56
it may be appropriate to “infer a legislative objective from a committee’s rejection of pro-
posed language”).
52. 2 MARYLAND HOUSE JOURNAL 1802–03 (statements of Del. Smigiel introducing floor
amendment no. 323727/2).  As he explained on the floor, this amendment would have
incorporated the Maryland Code’s contract murder provisions and exempted a defendant,
who was the killer or the “contractor” in a murder for hire, from the enhanced evidentiary
requirements. MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 2-303(g)(1)(vi)–(vii) (LexisNexis 2002 &
Supp. 2010) (mistakenly cited as id. § 2-301(g)(1)(vi)–(vii) in the amendment).  On the
floor, Delegate Smigiel explained that such “contractors” do not leave DNA, are not caught
on video, and usually do not give videotaped confessions.  Audio file: Proceedings on S.B.
279, Maryland House of Delegates at 34:20–35:00 (Mar. 25, 2009, Sess. No. 1) [hereinafter
House Proceedings, Mar. 25, Sess. No. 1] (on file with the Maryland Law Review).  Dele-
gate Smigiel criticized the “game plan” of the Governor and the Senate, who, according to
Smigiel, conspired to have him accept the bill “as currently written.” Id. at 33:35–35:20.
Delegate Curt Anderson responded:
Today’s bill is not about how we amend the bill that came from the Senate or how
we fine-tune it; it is about repeal or not repeal.  There are many of us who are
disappointed that the repeal bill did not come from the Senate.  I am one of
them.  I am sadly disappointed that I cannot vote to repeal the death penalty in
the state of Maryland.
Id. at 35:43–36:13.
Delegate Anderson continued:
This amendment and the amendments that will follow are simply an attempt to
amend the bill and send it back to the Senate.  There is no saying what’s going to
happen once the bill goes back there.  All we’re saying, those of us who wanted to
vote for repeal of the death penalty, is that we fought the good fight, and we’re
fighting now for a compromise between a death penalty that most of us do not
want and a compromise . . . with the existing law.
Id. at 37:48–38:22.  The House rejected the amendment by a vote of ninety to forty-four. 2
MARYLAND HOUSE JOURNAL 1803.
53. 3 MARYLAND HOUSE JOURNAL (statements of Del. Shewell introducing floor amend-
ment no. 323321/01); Audio file: Proceedings on S.B. 279, Maryland House of Delegates at
1:21:50–1:23:45 (Mar. 26, 2009, Sess. No. 1) [hereinafter House Proceedings, Mar. 26, Sess.
No. 1] (on file with the Maryland Law Review).  The House of Delegates rejected the
amendment by a vote of seventy-nine to fifty-eight. 3 MARYLAND HOUSE JOURNAL 1929.
54. 3 MARYLAND HOUSE JOURNAL 1931 (statements of Del. McDonough introducing
floor amendment no. 343523/01).  The House rejected the amendment by a vote of
eighty-nine to fifty. Id.
55. Id. at 1927 (statements of Del. Serafini introducing floor amendment no. 743924/
01).  The Vice Chair of the Judiciary Committee, Delegate Sandy Rosenberg, stated that
the Judiciary Committee had considered this amendment, but had decided that it was una-
ble to give more value to one human life than another under a theory that “the death of
some people merit the death penalty and the murder of others does not.”  House Proceed-
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The House also rejected amendments to add evidentiary profiles
that would make a defendant death-eligible—for example, when “the
defendant was in the unexplained, exclusive possession of the body of
the victim”57 or when “the defendant was apprehended in the act of
murder or at the end of an uninterrupted pursuit after being
observed committing the act.”58  In addition, the House rejected
amendments to add additional types of evidence to the enhanced
evidentiary requirements that would make a defendant death-eligible
if, for example, “an audio [not just video] recording of the murder
or the ordering of the murder . . . conclusively link[ed] the de-
fendant to the murder,”59 “photographic evidence . . . conclusively
ings, Mar. 26, Sess. No. 1, supra note 53, at 1:00:21–1:01:03.  The House rejected the R
amendment by a vote of seventy-five to sixty-one.  3 MARYLAND HOUSE JOURNAL 1928.
56. 3 MARYLAND HOUSE JOURNAL 1929 (statements of Del. Smigiel introducing floor
amendment no. 783028/01).  In the floor debate, the sponsor of the amendment said it
would not apply if a correctional officer killed an inmate, because the defendant in that
case would not have been “confined in a correctional facility.”  House Proceedings, Mar.
26, Sess. No. 1, supra note 53, at 1:35:13–1:36:00.  The House rejected the amendment by a R
vote of eighty-seven to forty-nine. 3 MARYLAND HOUSE JOURNAL 1930.
57. 2 MARYLAND HOUSE JOURNAL 1806 (statements of Del. McComas introducing floor
amendment no. 393326/02).  The House rejected the amendment by a vote of ninety-four
to forty-four. Id.
58. 3 MARYLAND HOUSE JOURNAL 1930 (statements of Del. Boteler introducing  floor
amendment no. 403420/01).  The House rejected the amendment by a vote of eighty-five
to forty-eight. Id.
59. 2 MARYLAND HOUSE JOURNAL 1803 (statements of Del. Smigiel introducing floor
amendment no. 103423/02).  Delegate Smigiel said this amendment would cover an audio
recording of a murder, and he offered, as an example, the murder of an undercover police
officer recorded on the “wire” the police officer was wearing.  House Proceedings, Mar. 25,
Sess. No. 1, supra note 52, at 54:50–58:14.  A delegate from Prince George’s County urged R
the House to “resist this and all amendments.” Id. at 1:02:38–1:03:35.  She acknowledged
that most legislation is not “perfect,” and said: “In matters of life and death, we should err
on the side of assuring that an innocent person is not put to death in our name.” Id.  She
added: “Do not let the perfect be the enemy of the good.” Id. at 1:05:04–1:05:10.  The
Minority Leader, Anthony J. O’Donnell, complained that the assertion that that the House
should reject all amendments, based on the alleged “take-it-or-leave-it” position of the Gov-
ernor and the Senate President, undermined the “bicameral process” and independence
of the House. Id. at 1:05:12–1:08:33.  The Vice Chair of the House Judiciary Committee,
Delegate Sandy Rosenberg, responded that the Judiciary Committee included members
“who have been working on this issue for more than two years; some for their professional
careers.” Id. at 1:08:33–1:09:45.  There was no “diktat” from the Governor’s office.  Rather,
the Judiciary Committee “reached an independent judgment” about Senate Bill 279. Id.
Moreover, the posture of Senate Bill 279 in the House was not unique.  “Over the course of
the years there have been other bills that have come to us in a similar posture,” in which
“an amendment kills the bill,” including some of the most controversial bills—for example,
those concerning “a woman’s right to choose,” “gun control,” and “stem cell research.” Id.
at 1:09:45–1:11:30.  He explained that this simply is “part of the process.” Id.  The House
rejected the amendment by a vote of seventy-nine to fifty-nine. 2 MARYLAND HOUSE JOUR-
NAL 1803.
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link[ed] the defendant to the murder,”60 or “fingerprint evidence”
existed.61
60. 2 MARYLAND HOUSE JOURNAL 1803–04 (statements of Del. Kipke introducing floor
amendment no. 603528/01).  Kipke offered a photo taken by a cell phone as an example
of “photographic evidence;” he argued that if it “conclusively links the defendant to the
murder,” it should suffice to establish death-eligibility, as much as a videorecording.”
House Proceedings, Mar. 25, Sess. No. 1, supra note 52, at 1:17:37–1:19:08.  The ensuing R
debate focused on whether a “single frame” photograph, like that produced by a cell
phone photograph, would qualify as a videorecording, thus making the proposed amend-
ment unnecessary. Id. at 1:19:08–1:22:24.  During this debate, there was reference to a
Letter of Advice from the Office of the Maryland Attorney General in which Counsel to the
General Assembly concluded that “[a]lthough a court might construe the term ‘video’ [in
S.B. 279] to mean a single frame, the more likely construction is that it refers to multiple
frames.” Id. at 1:19:55–1:20:09.  Letter from Dan Friedman, Counsel to the Gen. Assembly,
to Sen. Alex X. Mooney, Md. State Senate (Mar. 5, 2009), available at http://www.oag.state.
md.us/Opinions/Advice2009/MOONEY_3_5.pdf.  The House rejected the amendment by
a vote of eighty-two to forty-nine. 2 MARYLAND HOUSE JOURNAL 1804.
61. 2 MARYLAND HOUSE JOURNAL 1804 (statement of Del. Krebs introducing floor
amendment no. 533121/01).  In the floor debate, Delegate Krebs began by identifying
three “schools of thought” on the death penalty in the House of Delegates: “There are
people who are definitely against the death penalty no matter what, there are people who
support it, and there are many people who just want to make sure it never happens to an
innocent person.”  House Proceedings, Mar. 25, Sess. No. 1, supra note 52, at R
1:22:44–1:24:57.  She argued that “fingerprint evidence” is an established category of relia-
ble evidence and therefore should be accepted as the basis of a death penalty sentence. Id.
She criticized the letter of advice from the Maryland Office of the Attorney General that
concluded that the term “biological evidence” in S.B. 279 does not include “fingerprint
evidence.” Id.; see also Letter of Advice from Dan Friedman, Counsel to the Gen. Assembly,
to Sen. Alex X. Mooney, Md. State Senate (Mar. 4, 2009), available at http://www.oag.state.
md.us/Opinions/Advice2009/MOONEY_3_4.pdf.
A delegate from Prince George’s County responded that allowing fingerprint evidence
to support a death penalty sentence would be “going backwards” from the enhanced relia-
bility provided by the bill, because fingerprint evidence “is less reliable . . . [and] more
likely to be tampered with.”  House Proceedings, Mar. 25, Sess. No. 1, supra note 52, at R
1:28:00–1:28:38.  The House rejected the amendment by a vote of eighty-eight to forty-one.
2 MARYLAND HOUSE JOURNAL 1805.
Delegate Krebs did not address the other two parts of her proposed amendment.  The
first would have defined “biological evidence” by reference to Section 8-201 of the Crimi-
nal Procedure Article (the DNA Statute) (Delegate Krebs’ amendment mistakenly referred
to “Section 8-201 of the Criminal Law Article”), which would include, “but . . . not [be]
limited to, any blood, hair, saliva, semen, epithelial cells, buccal cells, or other bodily sub-
stances from which genetic marker groupings may be obtained.” MD. CODE ANN., CRIM.
PROC. § 8-201(a)(2) (LexisNexis 2008 & Supp. 2010); 2 MARYLAND HOUSE JOURNAL 1804
(statements of Del. Kreb introducing floor amendment no. 533121/01).  The second
would have defined “DNA evidence” by reference to the definition in Section 10-915(a) of
the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, which provides:
(2) ‘Deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA)’ means the molecules in all cellular forms
that contain genetic information in a chemical structure of each individual.
(3) ‘DNA profile’ means an analysis of genetic loci that have been validated ac-
cording to standards established by: (i) The Technical Working Group on DNA
Analysis Methods (TWGDAM); or (ii) The DNA Advisory Board of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation.
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In addition, the House rejected attempts to expand the types of
recordings that would satisfy the evidentiary requirements of Senate
Bill 279.  For example, the House rejected an amendment that would
have allowed a videorecording, instead of a videotaped interrogation
and confession, to qualify for the death penalty62 and an amendment
that would have defined the types of videorecordings that could “con-
clusively link . . . a defendant to the murder” as including “a recording
using digital media or any magnetic tape or photographic film used to
record visual images for subsequent playback or broadcasting.”63  Fi-
nally, the House rejected an amendment that would have allowed a
death sentence based solely on eyewitness testimony when “the defen-
dant was previously known by at least one of the eyewitnesses.”64
In the end, a substantial number of delegates who supported the
death penalty voted for the bill without amendments.  They consid-
ered the bill a fair compromise that would help prevent inappropriate
capital convictions and sentences.65
MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 10-915(a) (LexisNexis 2006 & Supp. 2010); 2 MARY-
LAND HOUSE JOURNAL 1804 (statements of Del. Kreb introducing floor amendment no.
533121/01) (citing CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 10-915(a)).
62. 2 MARYLAND HOUSE JOURNAL 1805 (statements of Del. Krebs introducing floor
amendment no. 583529/01).  The amendment’s term “recording” was broader in scope
than the bill’s language.  A “recording” included “a recording using digital media or any
magnetic tape or photographic film used to record visual images and associated sound for
subsequent playback or broadcasting.” Id.  The House rejected the amendment by a vote
of eighty-eight to forty-one. Id.
63. Id. at 1805 (statements of Del. Krebs floor amendment no. 583529/01).
64. 3 MARYLAND HOUSE JOURNAL 1929 (statements of Del. Kach introducing floor
amendment no. 883624/01).  The House rejected this amendment by a vote of ninety-one
to forty-two.
65. One delegate (“the gentleman from Baltimore County”) expressed doubts about
the bill (he was “concerned” about basing the death penalty on “evidentiary . . . sufficiency”
and not on “the heinousness of the crime”), but stated that with his “green vote,” he hoped
“we are moving . . . in the right direction; that we are making sure that we are only going to
be using this . . . for people who we are certain should be the ones who we have to [use it
on].”  House Proceedings, Mar. 26, Sess. No. 1, supra note 53, at 1:48:15–1:49:10.  Another R
delegate (“the gentleman from Montgomery” County), who described his family as victims
of “an egregious crime,” said:
I place my green vote today, because I feel as though, as a proponent and sup-
porter of the death penalty, that we need to lay to rest the concerns and fears that
we are putting people to death that are innocent.  No victim’s family wants to
hear that an innocent person has been put to death as a result of the death pen-
alty. . .  [E]ven though this bill is not perfect . . . [it] will lay[ ] . . . to rest the
concerns that are out there [about the execution of innocent people].
Id. at 1:50:03–1:51:30.  Another delegate (“the gentleman from the Eastern Shore”) said:
In my area, in Dorchester County, we had a man that was sentenced to death
[who was innocent], and I don’t think that the State can afford to be guilty of
killing someone who is innocent.  So, therefore, I have a green vote. . . .  If we are
going to err, let’s err . . . [to give] the person the opportunity to . . . live and
prove that he or she is innocent.
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III. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NEW LAW
A. Integrating the New and Pre-existing Death Penalty Laws
The five substantive death-eligibility limitations that existed in
Maryland’s prior death penalty law remain effective today.  These limi-
tations preclude imposition of the death penalty unless (1) the defen-
dant is convicted of first degree murder66 (2) with an aggravating
circumstance,67 (3) the defendant was at least eighteen-years-old68
and (4) not “mentally retarded” at the time of the homicide,69 and (5)
the defendant was a first degree principal, or in two special circum-
stances a second degree principal, in the murder.70  These five limita-
Id. at 1:56:07–1:56:48.  Another delegate (“the gentleman from Prince George’s County”)
said:
I support the death penalty.  I represent . . . a county that lost 132 lives last year to
murder. . . .  As much as I believe in capital punishment and the death penalty, I
can’t live with the fact of, if we even execute one person wrongly, then a tremen-
dous [in]justice [sic] has been done. . . .  I support the death penalty, and I am
proud to put my vote for Senate Bill 279.
Id. at 2:07:35–2:09:25.  Another delegate (“the gentleman from the Eastern Shore”) said:
I have a green vote today, for this bill, even though I think this bill is not exactly
what I would like to have had. . . .  This bill will keep the death penalty alive, and
in my district the overwhelming support has been for the death penalty, and
therefore I have cast a green vote here today.
Id. at 2:10:35–2:11:11.  Another delegate (“the gentleman from Prince George’s [County]
closest to me”) said:
I rise to explain my green vote. . .  I believe this bill as it stands before us is indeed
the reflection of the political process.  It is not what I wanted.  I oppose the death
penalty. . . .  Our decision to reject all the amendments . . . is a reflection of the
political process in the tradition of this body.  And, we should stand up and be
proud of that.
Id. at 2:19:14–2:20:18.  Another delegate explained his vote for the bill by noting a number
of innocent defendants who wrongfully had been convicted of serious crimes or
threatened with or given the death penalty, including Bernard Webster, Anthony Gray,
and Chris Conover. Id. at 2:21:25–2:22:20.
66. MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW §§ 2-201(b)(1)(i), -202(a) (LexisNexis 2002 & Supp.
2010).
67. Id. § 2-303(g), (h)(2).
68. Id. § 2-202(b)(2)(i).
69. Id. § 2-202(b)(2)(ii).
70. In all first degree murders, except murders of “a law enforcement officer while the
officer was performing the officer’s duties,” id. § 2-303(g)(1)(i), and murders in which
“the defendant employed or engaged another to commit the murder,” id. § 2-
303(g)(1)(vii), the defendant must be a principal in the first degree to be death-eligible.
Id. § 2-202(a)(2)(i)–(ii).  In the murder of a law enforcement officer, the defendant is
death-eligible if the defendant “was a principal in the second degree who: (A) willfully,
deliberately, and with premeditation intended the death of the law enforcement officer;
(B) was a major participant in the murder; and (C) was actually present at the time and
place of the murder.” Id. § 2-202(a)(2)(i)(2).  In a contract murder, the defendant is
death-eligible if “[t]he defendant engaged or employed another person to commit the
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tions made the majority of convicted murderers ineligible for the
death penalty prior to the enactment of Senate Bill 279.71
Once the decision maker determined that the defendant was
death-eligible, the decision maker had to decide whether—based on
the statutory aggravating circumstances and the statutory and nonstat-
utory mitigating circumstances—the defendant should be sentenced
to death or to life imprisonment, and if the latter, with or without the
possibility of parole.72  Senate Bill 279 added three evidentiary limita-
tions to the five pre-existing substantive limitations, only one of which
is necessary to establish death-eligibility.  The new evidentiary limita-
tions did not otherwise affect the capital punishment decisional
process.73
Now, for a court to impose the death penalty, a case must satisfy
all five substantive death-eligibility criteria, and the State must satisfy
one of the three new evidentiary tests—namely, that “biological evi-
dence or DNA evidence” linked “the defendant to the act of murder,”
that there was a “video taped, voluntary interrogation and confession
of the defendant to the murder,” or that “a video recording . . . con-
clusively link[ed] the defendant to the murder.”74  Once a capital case
passes these death-eligibility criteria, the decision maker must still de-
cide whether, based on relevant aggravating and mitigating circum-
stances, the defendant should be sentenced to death or to life
imprisonment, and if the latter, with or without the possibility of pa-
role.75  Senate Bill 279 therefore substantially limits the number of
murder defendants who are death-eligible without affecting the pre-
existing standards that capital decision makers, judges, or juries have
applied and will continue to apply in determining whether convicted
and death-eligible first degree murderers should be sentenced to
death.
murder and the murder was committed under an agreement or contract for remuneration
or the promise of remuneration.” Id. §§ 2-202(a)(2)(i), -303(g)(1)(vii).
71. MD. COMM’N ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, supra note 13, at 5 (“Only 22% of all R
murders met the statutory requirements that made those crimes eligible for the death
penalty.”).
72. CRIM. LAW § 2-303.
73. 2009 Md. Laws 1063–88.
74. 2 MARYLAND SENATE JOURNAL, 426th Sess. 1118 (2009) (statements by Sen. Zirkin
introducing floor amendment no. 553820/3 (adopted Mar. 3, 2009)).
75. CRIM. LAW § 2-303(i).
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B. Trifurcating the Capital Proceeding by Bifurcating the Sentencing
Hearing
Prior to the new law, the capital proceeding was bifurcated.76  At
trial, the decision maker decided whether the defendant was guilty of
first degree murder.77  At the sentencing hearing, the decision maker
decided whether the convicted murderer was eligible for the death
penalty.78  If he was, the decision maker decided whether any other
aggravating circumstances (in addition to the one necessary for death-
eligibility)79 and mitigating circumstances existed.80  If so, the deci-
sion maker decided whether the aggravating circumstances out-
weighed the mitigating circumstances making death the appropriate
penalty.81  If life imprisonment was appropriate, the decision maker
usually also decided whether the sentence should be with or without
the possibility of parole.82  Thus, the pre-existing sentencing hearing
combined death-eligibility decisions that had the hallmarks of guilt-
innocence decisions, such as whether the defendant was a first degree
principal, and those of traditional sentencing decisions, such as
whether the defendant should be sentenced to life imprisonment or
to death.83
After the enactment of Senate Bill 279, the Maryland Court of
Appeals, acting in its regulatory capacity, substantially changed the
capital sentencing process.  By revising rule 4-343, the court created a
trifurcated capital proceeding for defendants found guilty of first de-
gree murder.  The process consists of (1) a guilt-innocence trial to
decide whether the defendant is guilty of first degree murder,84 (2) an
initial death-eligibility hearing to determine whether, based on the
age and principalship criteria and at least one of the three evidentiary
criteria, the defendant is eligible for death,85 and if so, (3) a secondary
sentencing proceeding to determine whether two other death-eligibil-
ity criteria (nonretardation and at least one aggravating circumstance)
exist, and if so, whether, based on the aggravating circumstances and
76. Id. § 2-303(b).
77. Id.
78. Id. § 2-202.
79. Id. § 2-303(g).
80. Id. § 2-303(h).
81. Id. § 2-303(i).
82. Id. § 2-303(j)(4)(5).
83. See supra text accompanying notes 66–70, 72, 77–82. R
84. CRIM. LAW § 2-303(b).
85. MD. R. 4-343.
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mitigating circumstances (if any),86 the penalty will be death or life
imprisonment, with or without the possibility of parole.87
In its rulemaking capacity and based substantially on the recom-
mendations of its Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Pro-
cedure (“Rules Committee”),88 the Maryland Court of Appeals
decided to bifurcate the sentencing hearing, which resulted in the tri-
furcation of the capital proceeding.89  The Rules Committee based its
recommendation on the first two arguments that follow.90  I also pre-
sent a third argument, which the Rules Committee did not consider.
First, the Rules Committee explained that sentencing bifurcation
is “more efficient.”91  When the State cannot establish that the defen-
dant is eligible for the death penalty, bifurcation avoids much of the
costs in financial and human terms of the traditional capital sentenc-
ing hearing.92  Under the rule, at Phase I of the bifurcated capital
sentencing hearing, the factual issues will be limited to death-eligibil-
ity.93  In most cases, there will be substantial trial evidence that is rele-
vant to these issues and is admissible in the Phase I proceeding.94  If
the State fails to establish death-eligibility in Phase I, there will be no
need for the normally protracted Phase II capital sentencing proceed-
ing.95  Instead, Phase II will determine only whether the defendant is
sentenced to life imprisonment with the possibility of parole or life
imprisonment without the possibility of parole.96  Although, in most
cases the parties, especially the defendant, will introduce evidence in
these “life with or without parole” Phase II proceedings, the eviden-
tiary hearings, motions practice, and arguments will not be as pro-
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, Notice of Proposed Rules
Changes, 36 Md. Reg. 1118, 1119 (proposed July 1, 2009).
89. Court of Appeals of Maryland, Rules Order, 36 Md. Reg. 1513, 1513–14 (Sept. 25,
2009).
90. Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, Notice of Proposed Rules
Changes, 36 Md. Reg. at 1119–20.
91. Id. at 1119.
92. See id.
93. MD. R. 4-343(h).
94. Id.
95. See MD. R. 4-343(i)(1)(A) (stating that a sentencing jury or judge shall only com-
plete Phase II if certain findings are made in Phase I); Standing Committee on Rules of
Practice and Procedure, Notice of Proposed Rules Changes, 36 Md. Reg. at 1119 (explain-
ing that “[i]f the state does not prevail on Phase One issues, there would be no need for
the sentencing authority to do anything more but enter a sentence of life imprisonment
and determine whether it should be without parole”).
96. MD. R. 4-343(i)(1)(B).
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tracted as those in which death is a sentencing option.97  Moreover,
the emotional burdens on the victim’s surviving family and friends
should be somewhat reduced in Phase II proceedings in which the
death penalty is not an issue.98
Second, bifurcated capital sentencing should help to prevent jury
confusion and thereby produce more reliable sentencing decisions.
Under the new death penalty law, capital juries will be required to
make a variety of different decisions, often using different standards
and burdens of proof. They will make discrete factual decisions re-
garding death-eligibility based on the substantive and evidentiary cri-
teria.99  If they determine that the defendant is death-eligible, they
will find and weigh aggravating and mitigating circumstances100 and
make broader, more discretionary judgments including the ultimate
judgment about whether to impose death.101  Under the new law, ju-
ries will also apply different evidentiary standards depending on the
issues, including proof that establishes a proposition “conclusively,”102
proof that establishes a proposition beyond a reasonable doubt,103
and proof that establishes a proposition by a preponderance of the
evidence.104  These juries must also apply different burdens of persua-
sion sometimes imposed on the State105 and sometimes imposed on
the defendant.106  Combining the evidence that may be relevant to all
of these legal issues in one sentencing proceeding and asking juries to
apply the differing legal standards and burdens of persuasion to this
body of evidence creates a great risk of jury confusion and error.  Em-
pirical studies of capital jury decisions demonstrate that this risk is
97. See MD. COMM’N ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, supra note 13, at 47–49 (highlighting the R
additional costs of sentencing proceedings where death is an option).
98. Id. at 56.
99. See MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 2-202(a)(3) (LexisNexis 2002 & Supp. 2010) (re-
quiring fact-finders to determine whether the State presented evidence, such as biological
or DNA evidence, a videotaped, voluntary interrogation and confession, or videorecord-
ings linking the defendant to the murder).
100. Id. § 2-303(g)–(h).
101. Id. § 2-303(i)–(j).
102. Id. § 2-202(a)(3)(iii) (requiring the fact-finder to determine whether the State
presented “a video recording that conclusively links the defendant to the murder” (empha-
sis added)).
103. Id. § 2-303(g) (requiring fact-finders to “consider whether any . . . aggravating cir-
cumstances exist beyond a reasonable doubt”).
104. Id. § 2-303(h)(2) (requiring the fact-finder to determine whether “any of the fol-
lowing mitigating circumstances exists based on a preponderance of the evidence”).
105. Id. § 2-303(g) (requiring the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the exis-
tence of aggravating circumstances).
106. Id. § 2-303(h)(2) (requiring the defendant to show, only by a preponderance of
the evidence, the existence of mitigating circumstances).
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very real.107  The risk of confusion and error is decreased by bifur-
cating the sentencing hearing as rule 4-343 has done, thereby allocat-
ing the more discrete factual death-eligibility questions to Phase I and
preserving the traditional, more discretionary sentencing issues for
Phase II.108
Third, sentencing bifurcation helps to make the capital sentenc-
ing procedure fairer.  Before the enactment of the new law, capital
defendants argued that the admission of facts relevant to sentenc-
ing—for example, a defendant’s substantial criminal record or al-
leged prior bad acts—undermined the integrity of discrete death-
eligibility fact-finding decisions.109  These latter decisions, such as
whether the defendant killed the victim with his own hands, were
more like guilt-innocence decisions than sentencing decisions.110  The
adoption of revised rule 4-343 “mooted” these arguments by effec-
tively accepting them.
To appreciate this “fairness” argument, assume that A and B are
standing trial for the murder of V, who was not a police officer.111
The issue at trial is who killed V.  If A killed V with his hands, he is
death-eligible.112  If B killed V, A is not death-eligible, even if A
handed B the knife.113  The trial jury could convict both A and B of
first degree murder under the theory that they were, at least, mutual
107. See CRAIG HANEY, DEATH BY DESIGN: CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AS A SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGI-
CAL SYSTEM 164–88 (2005) (discussing studies of California capital juries conducted by the
author and others, all pointing to low comprehension of capital sentencing instructions);
Stephen P. Garvey et al., Correcting Deadly Confusion: Responding to Jury Inquiries in Capital
Cases, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 627 (2000) (replicating a capital case with a test jury and finding
low levels of comprehension of the sentencing instructions given in the actual case).
108. See Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, Notice of Proposed
Rules Changes, 36 Md. Reg. 1118, 1119 (proposed July 1, 2009) (noting that “the task
facing the sentencing authority, particularly a jury, [is] already complex enough” and sug-
gesting that the amended rule would decrease such confusion).
109. See Jose´ Felipe Anderson, Will the Punishment Fit the Victims?  The Case for Pre-Trial
Disclosure and the Uncharted Future of Victim Impact Information in Capital Jury Sentencing, 28
RUTGERS L.J. 367, 432–33 (1997) (explaining the importance of “provid[ing] adequate
procedural safeguards for the most important and potentially volatile evidence that is likely
to be presented in support of a convicted murder’s possible execution”).
110. See Margo A. Rocklin, Place the Death Penalty on a Tripod, or Make It Stand on Its Own
Two Feet?, 4 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 788, 796 (2007) (discussing the risk that presenting
jury members with information applicable to sentencing may prejudice their death-eligibil-
ity determination).
111. Section 2-202(a)(2)(ii) of the Criminal Law Article allows for the imposition of the
death penalty on a principal in the second degree if the victim was a law enforcement
officer. CRIM. LAW § 2-202(a)(2)(ii).
112. Id. § 2-202(a)(2)(i) (establishing the death-eligibility of a defendant found guilty of
first degree murder who was a first degree principal in the crime).
113. Id. If A handed B the knife, then A would no longer constitute a first degree princi-
pal in the crime.
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aiders and abettors without resolving the first degree principalship is-
sue.114  At the sentencing hearing, the jury would have to decide
whether A or B killed V, because only a first degree principal—one
who killed with his own hand—would be death-eligible.115
Before resolving the principalship issue in this hypothetical case,
however, the jury would hear evidence about the criminal records and
perhaps unadjudicated prior bad acts of both A and B.116  The jury
might hear, for example, that A had been convicted of assault and had
been accused of a prior killing, but that B had no similar history.
Then, the jury would have to decide whether it believed A or B had
killed V with his own hand.  The risk that the jury would unfairly con-
clude that A, rather than B, had killed V based on A’s record (rather
than the facts of the case) is substantial, which is why the Maryland
Rules of Evidence generally prevent the admission of such informa-
tion at trial.117
Revised rule 4-343 mandates that the capital sentencing jury de-
cide the principalship issue and five other fact-specific death-eligibility
issues118 in Phase I before hearing all of the evidence about the defen-
dant’s criminal record and unadjudicated prior bad acts.119  The over-
all goal promoted by revised rule 4-343 is to assist the jury in deciding
these fact-dependent sentencing issues in a fair and impartial manner.
IV. AN ASSESSMENT OF THE NEW CAPITAL LAW: THE MEANING OF
THE KEY TERMS IN MARYLAND’S NEW DEATH PENALTY LAW
A. Interpretive Principles
To implement the new death penalty law, the Maryland courts
must first identify the applicable principles of statutory interpretation.
Maryland courts will then need to interpret the new law’s key terms in
light of these principles.  I begin with a consideration of the applica-
ble principles of statutory interpretation.
For years, judges, scholars, and lawyers have defended and have
criticized different theories of statutory interpretation.120  Within this
114. Id. § 2-201.
115. See supra note 112 and accompanying text. R
116. CRIM. LAW § 2-303(e)(1)(iii).
117. See MD. R. 5-404(a) (“Evidence of a person’s character or a trait of character is not
admissible for the purpose of proving action in conformity therewith.”).
118. MD. R. 4-343(h)(2) (listing required findings in Phase I of the sentencing hearing).
119. See id.
120. See John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 4
(2001) (“The question of text versus purpose has always troubled the law of statutory inter-
pretation—and it always will.” (footnote omitted)). See generally WILLIAM D. POPKIN, STAT-
UTES IN COURT: THE HISTORY AND THEORY OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 1 (1999) (noting
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body of scholarship, produced by classic121 and contemporary schol-
ars,122 are competing claims about the validity, vel non, of intentional-
ist,123 textualist,124 dynamic,125 and minimalist126 theories of
interpretation.
I do not enter into this debate here.  Rather, I identify some of
the interpretive principles that Maryland’s appellate courts consist-
ently have endorsed—rightly or wrongly—even though these princi-
ples sometimes are at odds with themselves.127  I apply these
that recent “years have seen an explosion of interest in the field of statutory
interpretation”).
121. E.g., Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REV.
527, 527–28 (1947) (“When we talk of statutory construction we have in mind cases in
which there is a fair contest between two readings, neither of which comes without respect-
able title deeds.”); Karl L. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules
or Canons About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 399 (1950) (“[T]he
problem will recur in statutory construction as in the handling of case-law: Which of the
technically correct answers (a) should be given; (b) will be given—and Why?”); Max Radin,
Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 863, 863 (1930) (“[I]n a constantly increasing num-
ber of litigated cases, the point of departure is as likely as not to be a statute, the effect of
which is to be estimated, the meaning discovered, and the applicability affirmed or
rejected.”).
122. E.g., EINER ELHAUGE, STATUTORY DEFAULT RULES: HOW TO INTERPRET UNCLEAR LEG-
ISLATION 1 (2008) (“You are a conscientious judge, and you have a problem. . . .  [T]he
primary issue before you is to determine the meaning of the statute.  Unfortunately, you
also know that there is no consensus about how to do that.”); HENRY M. HART & ALBERT M.
SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW (Wil-
liam N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994); Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes’ Do-
mains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 533 (1983) (“The construction of an ambiguous document is
a work of judicial creation or re-creation.”).
123. E.g., Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV.
204, 209–17 (1980) (“[T]he intentionalist interprets a provision by ascertaining the inten-
tions of those who adopted it.”).
124. E.g., ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW
23–25 (1997) (“A text should not be construed strictly, and it should not be construed
leniently; it should be construed reasonably, to contain all that it fairly means.”).
125. E.g., GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 31–43 (1982)
(describing “the updating of laws” as a “plausible function of interpretation”); WILLIAM N.
ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 10 (1994) (arguing that “statutory in-
terpretation in the United States is . . . dynamic, as a matter of practice and positive the-
ory”); Anthony D’Amato, The Injustice of Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 64 U. CIN. L. REV.
911, 912 (1996) (arguing that “the public-law theory of ‘dynamic statutory interpretation’
is worse than misguided—it is unjust”).
126. E.g., Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress Is a “They,” Not an “It”: Legislative Intent as Oxymo-
ron, 12 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 239, 253 (1992) (“If the plain meaning of the statute’s lan-
guage does not cover a circumstance, then the statue is inapplicable.  In a sense, this
position, a minimalist one for courts, asserts that the legislature must complete otherwise
incomplete statutes, not the courts.”).
127. See Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 263 & n.16 (1994) (“It is not uncom-
mon to find ‘apparent tension’ between different canons of statutory construction. As Pro-
fessor Llewellyn famously illustrated, many of the traditional canons have equal opposites.”
(citing Llewellyn, supra note 121, at 402)). R
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principles to the provisions of Maryland’s new death penalty law that
pose the greatest challenges.  I do not organize these principles in a
rigid set of interpretive rules because this would be fruitless.  Mary-
land courts, like other state and federal courts, have not succeeded in
constructing and consistently applying rules of statutory interpreta-
tion.128  Instead, I identify and apply the interpretive principles that
Maryland’s appellate decisions most frequently recognize and apply.
The oft-stated “cardinal rule of statutory construction” is to iden-
tify and to follow the intent of the Maryland General Assembly.129  Ma-
ryland courts assume that for many statutes a legislative “intent” that
courts can identify and apply exists.130
One source of legislative intent is the language of the statute.131
Maryland appellate decisions often note that “if the language is clear
and unambiguous,” then the court “need go no further.”132  While the
statutory text is the place to start, the text is usually not so inherently
clear as to preclude a further search for meaning.133  If the statutory
text is ambiguous, it matters whether the statute in question is crimi-
nal or civil.  If statutory text in a criminal statute is ambiguous, courts
often apply a strict construction rule,134 in part, to give effect to the
“rule of lenity.”135  When interpreting ambiguous terms, including
128. HART & SACKS, supra note 122, at 1169 (“American courts have no intelligible, gen- R
erally accepted, and consistently applied theory of statutory interpretation.”).
129. Montgomery Cnty. v. Buckman, 333 Md. 516, 523, 636 A.2d 448, 451 (1994); see
also, e.g., W. Corr. Inst. v. Geiger, 371 Md. 125, 140, 807 A.2d 32, 41 (2002) (“Repeatedly,
we have emphasized that ‘the paramount object of statutory construction is the ascertain-
ment and effectuation of the real intention of the Legislature.’” (quoting Whiting-Turner
Contracting Co. v. Fitzpatrick, 366 Md. 295, 301, 783 A.2d 667, 670 (2001))).
130. See, e.g., In re Taylor, 312 Md. 58, 70, 537 A.2d 1179, 1185 (1988) (“We see the
legislative intent in enacting § 11-504(b)(1) emanating bright and clear from the plain
language of the subsection.”).
131. Bible v. State, 411 Md. 138, 153, 982 A.2d 348, 356 (2009) (explaining that the
statutory language is the “primary source” of legislative intent (citing Williams v. State, 329
Md. 1, 15, 616 A.2d 1275, 1282 (1992))).
132. Farris v. State, 351 Md. 24, 28, 716 A.2d 237, 240 (1998), superseded by statute on other
grounds, 1999 Md. Laws 422, as recognized in Boffen v. State, 372 Md. 724, 742–43, 816 A.2d
88, 98 (2003).
133. Cf. Schwartz & Conn, supra note 51, at 434 (stating that “an understanding of the R
words in the statute is necessary but not always sufficient, because the text is merely the
skin of something deeper: the General Assembly’s purpose, aim or policy” (internal quota-
tion marks omitted)).
134. Farris, 351 Md. at 28–29, 716 A.2d at 240 (“Criminal statutes must be strictly con-
strued in favor of the defendant to prevent courts from extending punishment to cases not
plainly within the language of the statute.” (citing Tapscott v. State, 343 Md. 650, 654, 684
A.2d 439, 441 (1996); Jones v. State, 304 Md. 216, 220, 498 A.2d 622, 624 (1985))).
135. State v. Purcell, 342 Md. 214, 229, 674 A.2d 936, 944 (1996) (“‘Generally, in con-
struing penal statutes we employ the ‘rule of lenity,’ that is, statutes are strictly construed,
in favor of the accused.’” (quoting State v. Kennedy, 320 Md. 749, 754, 580 A.2d 193, 195
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those in criminal statutes, Maryland courts find meaning in “the
objectives and purposes expressed by the Legislature,”136 in the other
words in the same provision, in the words in other provisions of the
same statute (by “harmonizing” the provisions137 or by accepting the
negative implications of the accompanying text138), and in the terms
of other statutes relating to the same subject matter.139
In identifying “the objectives and purposes expressed by the Leg-
islature,”140 Maryland courts also give substantial weight to legislative
history.  Relevant legislative history may include adopted and rejected
amendments,141 the “relationship” of the law being interpreted to
“earlier and subsequent [related] legislation,”142 “legislative reports
including Bill Analysis reports, Floor reports, Fiscal Notes, reports by
study or advisory committees, and other material concerning General
Assembly bills found in the Department of Legislative Services’ bill
files, or, earlier, in the Department of Legislative Reference’s bill
files.”143
(1990))). But see Wynn v. State, 313 Md. 533, 540, 546 A.2d 465, 469 (1988) (noting that
“‘[w]here public or social interest in penal legislation is especially great, the policy of giv-
ing penal laws a very strict construction may be relaxed.’” (quoting 3 SUTHERLAND, STATU-
TORY CONSTRUCTION § 59.05, at 33 (4th ed. 1986))).
136. Farris, 351 Md. at 28–29, 716 A.2d at 240.
137. United States v. Ambrose, 403 Md. 425, 440, 942 A.2d 755, 764 (2008) (“[S]tatutory
text should be read so that no word, clause, sentence, or phrase is rendered superfluous
but rather with an eye towards harmonizing multiple provisions within the statutory
scheme.” (citing Kushell v. Dep’t of Natural Res., 385 Md. 563, 577, 870 A.2d 186, 193
(2005))).
138. See, e.g., Breitenbach v. N.B. Handy Co., 366 Md. 467, 482, 784 A.2d 569, 578
(2001) (finding negative implication in statutory scheme); Citizens Bank of Md. v. Md.
Indus. Finishing Co., 338 Md. 448, 463, 659 A.2d 313, 320 (1995) (same).
139. Pete v. State, 384 Md. 47, 65, 862 A.2d 419, 429 (2004) (“‘[V]arious consistent and
related enactments, although made at different times and without reference to one an-
other, nevertheless should be harmonized as much as possible.’” (quoting State v. Bricker,
321 Md. 86, 93, 581 A.2d 9, 12 (1990))).
140. Farris, 351 Md. at 28–29, 716 A.2d at 240.
141. In re Anthony R., 362 Md. 51, 58, 763 A.2d 136, 140 (2000) (citing Kaczorowski v.
Mayor of Balt., 309 Md. 505, 514–15, 525 A.2d 628, 632–33 (1987)).
142. Id.
143. Moore v. State, 388 Md. 623, 635–36 n.4, 882 A.2d 256, 264 n.4 (2005); see also
Bienkowski v. Brooks, 386 Md. 516, 542–43, 873 A.2d 1122, 1137–38 (2005) (analyzing the
1978 constitutional amendments to Article IV, Section 22 by evaluating the Department of
Legislative Reference’s bill file); Comptroller of the Treasury v. Phillips, 384 Md. 583,
600–01, 865 A.2d 590, 599–600 (2005) (analyzing Section 7-304 of the Tax-General Article
by referring to the House committee bill file); Collins v. State, 383 Md. 684, 695–96, 861
A.2d 727, 734 (2004) (analyzing Article 27, Section 291A of the Maryland Code by refer-
ring to the Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee’s bill file).
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B. Key Provisions
As has been the case with capital sentencing laws in general, the
new Maryland capital law raises a number of legal issues.144  This
country is deeply divided about capital punishment.145  This funda-
mental schism is embodied in our capital laws and in our constitu-
tional law, which Justice Scalia has criticized as the equivalent of
jurisprudential schizophrenia.146  The ebb and flow of majoritarian
mood and the democratic need to give voice to the deeply held views
of both death penalty supporters and opponents have produced sev-
eral generations of compromised laws.147  These laws have, in turn,
produced several generations of interpretive and constitutional
decisions.148
The Maryland Court of Appeals has not yet reviewed the new cap-
ital law.149  A recent trial court opinion, however, identifies and re-
144. See, e.g., Molly E. Grace, Note, Baze v. Rees: Merging Eighth Amendment Precedents into
a New Standard for Method of Execution Challenges, 68 MD. L. REV. 430 (2009) (discussing the
Supreme Court’s evaluation of the State of Kentucky’s death penalty statute, which made
“death by lethal injection . . . [its] default method” of execution).
145. See Michael K. Brown, The Death Penalty and the Politics of Racial Resentment in the Post
Civil Rights Era, 58 DEPAUL L. REV. 645, 645 (2009) (discussing the trends in American
public opinion of the death penalty over several decades); Gregg R. Murray, Raising Consid-
erations: Public Opinion and the Fair Application of the Death Penalty, 84 SOC. SCI. Q. 753,
753–54 (2003) (assessing the complex nature of individuals’ opinions of the death
penalty).
146. See Abdul-Kabir v. Quarterman, 550 U.S. 233, 284 (2007) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(“[T]his Court’s vacillating pronouncements have produced grossly inequitable treatment
of those on death row.”); Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 182 (2006) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(describing the Court’s death penalty jurisprudence as “incoherent”); Walton v. Arizona,
497 U.S. 639, 664 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)
(“To acknowledge that ‘there perhaps is an inherent tension’” in the Supreme Court’s
death penalty jurisprudence “is rather like saying that there was perhaps an inherent ten-
sion between the Allies and the Axis Powers in World War II.” (quoting McCleskey v.
Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 363 (1987) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)), overruled by Ring v. Arizona,
536 U.S. 584 (2002).
147. See Andrew Ditchfield, Note, Challenging the Intrastate Disparities in the Application of
Capital Punishment Statutes, 95 GEO. L.J. 801, 801–02 (2007) (observing that “[t]he thirty-
eight states that have retained the death penalty do not apply it with comparable
frequency”).
148. John D. Bessler, Revisiting Beccaria’s Vision: The Enlightenment, America’s Death Penalty,
and the Abolition Movement, 4 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 195 (2009) (discussing the Supreme
Court’s death penalty jurisprudence from Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), to Ken-
nedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008)).
149. This is not surprising given that the new law was enacted in 2009 and that capital
trials and sentencing proceedings are protracted. See Recent Case, Illinois Supreme Court
Holds That a Disproportionately Long Stay on Death Row Does Not Constitute Cruel and Unusual
Punishment—People v. Simms, No. 86200, 2000 WL 1131823 (Ill. Aug. 10, 2000), 114 HARV.
L. REV. 648, 651 (2000) (“A lengthy appellate process is . . . an unavoidable byproduct of
the just and fair application of the death penalty.”).
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solves a number of the law’s potential issues.  In State v. Stephens,150
Judge Paul Hackner of the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County
rejected a number of challenges to the law.151  In Stephens, the State
notified the defendant that it intended to introduce biological and
DNA evidence and to produce expert testimony that would link the
defendant to the murder for which he was indicted.152  The State
therefore gave notice that it would seek to satisfy this DNA death-eligi-
bility criterion.153  The defendant responded by filing a motion that
challenged the constitutionality of the new law.154 State v. Stephens
provides a good starting point for considering the issues raised by the
new capital law.
1. The Burden of Persuasion and the Standard of Proof
The new law provides that a defendant who has been found guilty
of first degree murder is death-eligible “only if” the State presents the
court or jury with one of three forms of evidence.155  The law puts the
burden—at least the burden of production—on the State to present
the evidence.
The new law, however, does not specifically allocate the burden
of persuasion or identify the required standard of proof.  The legisla-
ture might have assumed that those implementing the new law would
fit it into the traditional criminal model that requires the State to
prove certain facts beyond a reasonable doubt.156  This is precisely
what the Maryland Court of Appeals had done, by Rule, to implement
the pre-existing death-eligibility principalship criteria.  The Rule re-
quired, and continues to require, that the State prove first degree
principalship, or one of its two second degree principalship excep-
150. No. K-08-646 (Md. Cir. Ct. Dec. 10, 2009), available at http://www.circuitcourt.org/
images/pdfstephens/2009-12-10_memorandum_opinion_constitutionality_of_revised_stat-
ute.pdf.
151. Id. at 19–20.
152. Id. at 2.
153. See MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 2-202(a)(1) (LexisNexis 2002 & Supp. 2010) (re-
quiring the State to give the defendant thirty days written notice of its intention to seek the
death penalty).
154. Stephens, No. K-08-646, slip op. at 2.  Defendant’s motion was styled: “Motion to
Preclude the Death Penalty as the New Statute is Unconstitutional.” Id.
155. CRIM. LAW § 2-202(a)(3) (emphasis added). The State must present: “(i) biological
evidence or DNA evidence that links the defendant to the act of murder; (ii) a video taped,
voluntary interrogation and confession of the defendant to the murder; or (iii) a video
recording that conclusively links the defendant to the murder.” Id.
156. See Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 210 (1977) (“[T]he Due Process Clause
requires the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt all of the elements included
in the definition of the offense of which the defendant is charged.”).
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tions, beyond a reasonable doubt.157  The Maryland Court of Appeals
revised rule 4-343 to implement the new death penalty law and re-
quired the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt both the new
and old death-eligibility criteria.158
In the death-eligibility “statements,” the pre-existing substantive
death-eligibility criteria are stated clearly as facts.  Examples include:
“At the time of the murder, the defendant was 18 years of age or
older”;159 “[t]he defendant was a principal in the first degree to the
murder”;160 “[t]he defendant engaged or employed another person
to commit the murder”;161 or “the defendant was a principal in the
second degree” in the murder of “a law enforcement officer . . . in the
performance of the officer’s duties.”162  These provisions in the rule
incorporate, virtually verbatim, the statutory text.163
In revised rule 4-343, the new death-eligibility evidentiary criteria
are set forth in “statements.”  Thus, the State must prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that (1) “[t]he State has produced biological evidence
or DNA evidence that links the defendant to the act of murder”;164
(2) “[t]he State has produced a videotaped, voluntary interrogation and
confession of the defendant to the murder”;165 or (3) “[t]he State has
produced a video recording that conclusively links the defendant to the
murder.”166
This language is ambiguous in one respect.  What is it that the
State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt?  Must the State prove
that it has produced the three forms of evidence, or must the State
prove that the facts satisfy the elements of the death-eligibility criteria?
The answer plainly is the latter.  It would be absurd to apply the be-
yond a reasonable doubt standard to the question of whether or not
the State has produced or presented evidence relevant to an element.
157. See MD. R. 4-343(h)(2).
158. Id.
159. Id. (Phase I Findings, Finding 1).
160. Id. (Phase I Findings, Finding 6).
161. Id. (Phase I Findings, Finding 7).  The rule also requires that “the murder [be]
committed under an agreement or contract for remuneration or the promise of remunera-
tion.” Id.
162. Id. (Phase I Findings, Finding 8). In addition, the defendant: “(A) willfully, deliber-
ately, and with premeditation intended the death of the law enforcement officer; (B) was a
major participant in the murder; and (C) was actually present at the time and place of the
murder.” Id.
163. See MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 2-202(a)(2) (LexisNexis 2002 & Supp. 2010) (in-
corporating id. § 2-303(g)(1)(i), (vii)).
164. MD. R. 4-343(h)(2) (Phase I Findings, Finding 2) (emphasis added).
165. Id. (Phase I Findings, Finding 3) (emphasis added).
166. Id. (Phase I Findings, Finding 4) (emphasis added).
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Either it has or it has not.  In every other criminal law context, the
State must prove the key facts (those that prove elements) beyond a
reasonable doubt—not whether the State has introduced or
presented those facts.167
Moreover, the General Assembly’s overarching goal in enacting
the new law was to require that death-eligible convictions include
guarantees of enhanced reliability.168  That goal is accomplished only
if it is the facts in the death-eligibility tests that the State must prove
beyond a reasonable doubt—not if the State introduced some evi-
dence of these facts.  Accordingly, the State should be required to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that biological evidence or DNA evi-
dence links the defendant to the act of murder, that the defendant
confessed to the murder in a videotaped interrogation, or that a
videorecording links the defendant to the murder.169
In Stephens, the circuit court agreed with this conclusion.  The de-
fendant argued that the new law’s failure to “specify the method of
presentation of [the death-eligibility] evidence or the burden of proof
that must be met” rendered it unconstitutional.170  The court, how-
ever, rejected this argument: “It is well established that all of the ele-
ments that support a defendant’s eligibility for the death penalty must
be determined by the jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”171
The court interpreted the new law to impose this requirement on the
axiomatic assumption that legislatures know about and adopt constitu-
tional mandates when they enact laws, even if they are silent on the
point.172  The court also noted that revised rule 4-343 imposes the
proof beyond a reasonable doubt requirement on the State.173
167. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (holding that “the Due Process Clause
protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of
every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged”).
168. See supra text accompanying notes 28–65 (outlining the legislative debates over Sen- R
ate Bill 279).
169. As to the third death-eligibility criterion, the State should be required to prove
conclusively (a higher standard than beyond a reasonable doubt) that a videorecording
links the defendant to the murder. See supra notes 62–63 and accompanying text. R
170. State v. Stephens, No. K-08-646, slip op. at 14 (Md. Cir. Ct. Dec. 10, 2009).
171. Id. at 14.  The court cited Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), Apprendi v. New
Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), and Grandison v. State, 390 Md. 412, 889 A.2d 366 (2005), in
support of its conclusion. Stephens, No. K-08-646, slip op. at 14–15.
172. Stephens, No. K-08-646, slip op. at 15 (citing Pye v. State, 397 Md. 626, 635–36, 919
A.2d 632, 637 (2007)).
173. Id.
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2. Vagueness
In Stephens, the defendant also alleged that the textual provisions
of the three new death-eligibility criteria were unconstitutionally
vague, challenging the new law facially and as applied to him.174  He
posed facial challenges to all three of the new evidentiary death-eligi-
bility criteria.175  The court, however, properly limited the claim to the
part of the new law that applied to the defendant—the requirement
that “the State presents . . . biological evidence or DNA evidence that
links the defendant to the act of murder.”176  I consider all three pro-
visions here.
a. “The State Presents . . . Biological Evidence or DNA Evidence
That Links the Defendant to the Act of Murder”177
In Stephens, the court applied both Eighth Amendment and Four-
teenth Amendment vagueness standards to the above provision.178
The court began by noting that in assessing a statute’s constitutional-
ity, “there is a presumption that the statute is valid,” and that courts
will not invalidate an allegedly vague provision “if, ‘by any construc-
tion, it can be sustained.’”179  The court found that there were clear,
legislatively approved definitions of “biological evidence” and “DNA
evidence.”180  One Maryland statute, the court reasoned, defines DNA
as “‘the molecules in all cellular forms that contain genetic informa-
tion in a chemical structure of each individual.’”181  Another, the
court noted, defines biological evidence “in terms of bodily substances
from which genetic marker groupings may be obtained, including
blood, hair, saliva, semen and other bodily cells.”182  Moreover, the
court concluded, the word “links” commonly means “connects.”183
174. Id. at 3.
175. Id.
176. MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 2-202(a)(3)(i) (LexisNexis 2002 & Supp. 2010); see
Stephens, No. K-08-646, slip op. at 8–9 (noting that “whether subsections (a)(3)(ii) and (iii)
are vague or not, are questions that must be left for another day in another case”).
177. CRIM. LAW § 2-202(a)(3)(i).
178. Stephens, No. K-08-646, slip op. at 9–16.
179. Id. at 3 (citing Galloway v. State, 365 Md. 599, 614, 781 A.2d 851, 860 (2001)).
180. Id. at 16.
181. Id. (quoting MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 10-915 (LexisNexis 2006 & Supp.
2010)).
182. Id. (citing MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 8-201(a)(2) (LexisNexis 2008 & Supp.
2010)).
183. Id. (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004)).  The statutory text, “[t]he State
has produced biological evidence or DNA evidence that links the defendant to the act of
murder,” MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 2-202(a)(3)(i) (LexisNexis 2002 & Supp. 2010), is
broad enough to include the defendant’s DNA (or other biological evidence from the
defendant), the victim’s DNA (or other biological evidence from the victim), and other
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Thus, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that biological
evidence or DNA evidence, as defined elsewhere in the Maryland
Code, connects the defendant to the murder.  The selection of these
legislative definitions by the circuit court seems reasonable and is con-
sistent with the legislative history.184
b. “The State Presents a Video taped, Voluntary Interrogation and
Confession of the Defendant to the Murder”185
The death-eligibility scenario envisioned by the above provision is
that of a capital suspect brought to the stationhouse who, after exten-
sive questioning by a police detective, voluntarily acknowledges his
guilt.  This provision is a demanding test of death-eligibility that has
several components in need of interpretation.
The first term that requires interpretation is “interrogation.”  In-
terrogation means “[t]he formal or systematic questioning of a per-
son; esp[ecially], intensive questioning by the police, usu[ally], of a
person arrested for or suspected of committing a crime.”186  In my
opinion, systematic questions give essential context and thereby mean-
ing to the answers the questions elicit.  The requirement of an interro-
gation therefore seems to enhance the reliability of any resulting
confession.187
Although this death-eligibility criterion does not require that the
interrogator exercise police powers during the investigation, there are
good reasons to read such a requirement into the law.  First, as re-
vealed by the definition above, the governmental nature of the inter-
rogator is inherent in at least one common understanding of the word
interrogate.188  Second, since Miranda v. Arizona,189 the word interro-
gation has become associated with systematic police interrogation in
DNA (or other biological evidence)—for example, that of a pet dog that was killed with
the victim and near the victim, which was found on the defendant’s clothes. But see Wash-
ington v. Leuluaiailii, 77 P.3d 1192, 1197 (Wash. Ct. App. 2003) (holding that “canine
DNA identification” does not pass the “general acceptance” test and thus is not admissi-
ble).  In the vast majority of the cases, however, the DNA (or other biological evidence)
will be human.
184. See supra Part II.
185. CRIM. LAW § 2-202(a)(3)(ii).
186. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 895 (9th ed. 2009). “Interrogate” means “to question for-
mally and systematically.” MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 612 (10th ed. 1996).
187. But see Thomas P. Sullivan, Recent Development, Electronic Recording of Custodial
Interrogations: Everybody Wins, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1127, 1128 (2005) (arguing for
the adoption of a model act that requires the recording of all police interrogations because
“the absence of audio or video recordings has led to widespread problems arising from
disputes over what was said and done during custodial interrogations”).
188. See supra note 186 and accompanying text. R
189. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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the stationhouse—“custodial interrogation.”190  This is part of Ameri-
can legal culture, which I assume the Maryland General Assembly un-
derstood when it chose the word interrogation.  Third, when the word
interrogation is used elsewhere in the Maryland Code, it denotes for-
mal questioning as part of an investigation by officials exercising po-
lice powers.  For example, the Maryland Law Enforcement Officers’
Bill of Rights requires a “sworn law enforcement officer” or “the Gov-
ernor, the Attorney General or Attorney General’s designee” to con-
duct interrogations of police officers accused of misconduct and
strictly regulates the time, place, and manner of such interroga-
tions.191  Fourth, the legal limits on police interrogations serve the en-
hanced reliability purpose of this death-eligibility criterion.
Particularly important is the right of those being interrogated by po-
lice to stop the questioning at any time or to seek the guidance of
counsel in the interrogation.192  It is hard to imagine a form of private
interrogation that would have these reliability checks.  For all of these
reasons, the only interrogation that could satisfy this criterion is an
interrogation by a police officer or other governmental official exer-
cising police powers.
A second element of this criterion is a “confession.”  A confession
is more than an admission.  It is “[a] criminal suspect’s oral or written
acknowledgement of guilt, often including details about the crime.”193
The Maryland Court of Appeals “has recognized[ ] the fact that there
is a real . . .  difference between a confession and an admission in a
criminal case.”194  According to the court:
The distinction between a confession and an admission, as
applied in criminal law, is not a technical refinement, but
based upon the substantive differences of the character of
the evidence educed from each.  A confession is a direct ac-
knowledgment of guilt on the part of the accused, and, by
the very force of the definition, excludes an admission,
which, of itself, as applied in criminal law, is a statement by
the accused, direct or implied, of facts pertinent to the issue,
190. See id. at 478–79 (holding that a suspect must be warned of his right to remain
silent prior to a police interrogation).
191. MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 3-104 (LexisNexis 2003 & Supp. 2010). The statute
also requires disclosure of “the name, rank, and command” of the “interrogating officer.”
Id. § 3-104(d); see also MD. CODE ANN., CORR. SERVS. § 11-1005 (LexisNexis Supp. 2010)
(providing similar provisions governing the interrogation of correctional officers accused
of misconduct).
192. See Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484–85 (1981) (holding that police must stop
questioning once the accused invokes his right to counsel).
193. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 186, at 338. R
194. Vincent v. State, 220 Md. 232, 238, 151 A.2d 898, 902 (1959).
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and tending, in connection with proof of other facts, to
prove his guilt, but of itself is insufficient to authorize a
conviction.195
The hallmark of a confession, according to the court, is that a
defendant has “admitted facts which themselves (as distinguished
from facts which permitted inferences to be drawn therefrom) dis-
closed that the [defendant] was guilty”—that is, the admitted facts sat-
isfied all of the elements of the crime.196  Put another way, “[a]
confession of guilt is an admission of the criminal act itself, not an
admission of a fact or circumstance which together with other facts
warrant an inference of guilt.”197
Trial courts should be able to readily implement the third re-
quirement, that is, that a confession be “voluntary.”198  The pattern
jury instruction that applies to the admissibility of a defendant’s “state-
ments” contains a multi-factor test of voluntariness that can be readily
adapted to this death-eligibility criterion.199  This is not to say that the
distinctions between “statements,” “admissions,” and “confessions” are
clear; they are not.  It will be challenging for trial judges in capital
cases to adequately explain to a capital sentencing jury why, having
already considered the voluntariness of the defendant’s statement at
trial (in the first step of the sentencing proceeding), it must deter-
mine if that statement was a confession, and if so, whether that confes-
sion was voluntary.
Whatever the complications, the confession element of this
death-eligibility criterion is important.  It establishes that a death sen-
tence—government’s ultimate punishment—cannot, and should not,
be available for a defendant’s ambiguous answer to a question from a
police officer or to a question from a jailhouse informant who will
195. Ford v. State, 181 Md. 303, 307, 29 A.2d 833, 835 (1943) (quoting State v. Guie, 186
P. 329, 331 (Mont. 1919)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
196. Vincent, 220 Md. at 239, 151 A.2d at 902.
197. Ford, 181 Md. at 308, 29 A.2d at 835–36; see also 3 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE
IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 821, at 308 (James H. Chadbourn ed., rev. ed. 1970) (“A
confession is an acknowledgment in express words, by the accused . . . of the truth of the guilty fact
charged or of some essential part of it.”).
198. In this death-eligibility criterion, “voluntary” modifies both “interrogation” and
“confession.”  It reads: “a video taped, voluntary interrogation and confession of the defendant
to the murder.” MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 2-202(a)(3)(ii) (LexisNexis 2002 & Supp.
2010) (emphasis added).  Assumedly, the requirement that the interrogation be “volun-
tary” means that the suspect voluntarily agreed to be interrogated—that is, he did not
assert his privilege against self-incrimination and refuse to answer questions.
199. MD. INST. FOR CONTINUING PROF’L EDUC. OF LAWYERS, MARYLAND CRIMINAL PATTERN
JURY INSTRUCTION 3:18, at 65–66 (2006) (containing a nine factor test to determine
whether a statement made during interrogation is voluntary).
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profit from his testimony or for (in our multimedia age of readily
available recordation) unrecorded questions and answers between a
police officer and arrestee.  The new law requires that the entire pro-
cess, from initial interrogation through final confession, be
videotaped.200
Even in the age of digital technology, there are plausible reasons
to require that the interrogation and confession be videotaped.  Vide-
otapes are a reliable means of recording images and sound that is
readily available to police departments.201  Law enforcement offices
are now on notice that they must videotape interrogations and confes-
sions in potential capital cases if they wish to establish death-eligibility
under this criterion.  This is not a new development.  In 2008, the
Maryland General Assembly declared that “it is the public policy of
the State” for “law enforcement unit[s]” to “make reasonable efforts
to create” either “an audiovisual recording” or “an audio recording”
of “custodial interrogations” in murder and certain sexual assault
cases.202  The primary form of an audiovisual recording is a videotape.
Indeed, state laws, rules, and court decisions contain many references
to “videotape” and assume it is a reliable means of recordation.203
c. “The State Presents a Video Recording That Conclusively Links
the Defendant to the Murder”204
For purposes of the above provision, a “video” should be a visual
image captured by television, a videotape, a video cassette, or other
form of technology.205  A “recording” is a “record” of that image.206
200. CRIM. LAW § 2-202(a)(3)(ii).  A “videotape” is a “recording of visual images and
sound (as of a television production) made on magnetic tape.”  MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COL-
LEGIATE DICTIONARY, supra note 186, at 1317. R
201. Cf. Sullivan, supra note 187, at 1128 (arguing for the adoption of a model act that R
requires the recording of all police interrogations).
202. MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 2-402(1)–(2) (LexisNexis 2008).
203. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., BUS. REG. § 4.5-706 (LexisNexis 2010) (providing that a
videotape is an accepted form of evidence in Home Builder Guaranty Fund proceedings);
CRIM. LAW § 10-112 (providing that videotaped surveillance may be used to enforce anti-
dumping law); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 10-310 (LexisNexis 2006) (providing
that a videotape of the license plate of a motor vehicle is admissible in a proceeding to
collect a Maryland Transportation Authority toll or charge); MD. R. 2-416 (stating that civil
depositions may be recorded by videotape); Dep’t of Pub. Safety & Corr. Servs. v. Cole, 342
Md. 12, 17–18, 672 A.2d 1115, 1118 (1996) (finding videotape of a correctional officer’s
conduct admissible in an administrative disciplinary proceeding).
204. CRIM. LAW § 2-202(a)(3)(iii).
205. See MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY, supra note 186, at 1316 (defining R
“video” as “involving images on a television screen or computer display”).
206. See id. at 977 (defining “recording” as a synonym of “record,” or “something on
which . . . visual images have been recorded”).
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The General Assembly undoubtedly meant images of murders cap-
tured by security cameras and other reliable video devices.
While there are a number of synonyms for “conclusive,” it is at
least clear that conclusive requires an extremely demanding standard
of proof.  Conclusive is synonymous with “authoritative,” “decisive,”
“convincing,”207 “determinative,” and “definitive.”208  “Conclusive evi-
dence” means “evidence so strong as to overbear any other evidence
to the contrary.”209  It is final in that it “put[s] an end to debate . . . by
reason of irrefutability.”210  It would appear to be a higher and more
demanding standard of proof than beyond a reasonable doubt, al-
though it is difficult to identify the exact degree of difference.
3. Arbitrariness
In Stephens, the defendant also alleged that the new law would
result in arbitrary imposition of the death penalty,211 but the circuit
court rejected this challenge.212  The problem with the new law, ac-
cording to the defendant, was not that it lacked standards, but that its
standards were too narrow and its discretion too limited, making some
murderers death-eligible (those who satisfy the evidentiary criteria)
while failing to include others who commit as—or more—heinous
murders.213
The new law appears to put two values in tension: (1) the need
for enhanced reliability in capital guilt-innocence decisions to avoid
convicting and sentencing the innocent to death, a value which the
law largely satisfies, and (2) the need for proportionate punishment
for equally culpable murders, a value which the law substantially, but
incompletely, meets.214 Some murders that are not death-eligible
under the new law may be more culpable than those that are—for
207. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 186, at 329. R
208. MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY, supra note 186, at 303. R
209. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 186, at 636. R
210. MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY, supra note 186, at 239. R
211. State v. Stephens, No. K-08-646, slip op. at 4 (Md. Cir. Ct. Dec. 10, 2009).
212. Id. at 7–8.
213. Id. at 7 (highlighting that “[s]uch a result would be no less constitutional than if
one defendant was spared the death penalty because of a sympathetic jury while another
equally guilty defendant was sentenced to death because that jury did not find mitigation
in his case”).
214. The United States Supreme Court has adopted categorical constitutional rules to
enforce this proportionate culpability principle, barring executions of children age seven-
teen or younger, Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568–72 (2005), and of the mentally
retarded, Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 317–21 (2002).  For more on Roper and Adkins,
see Grace, supra note 144, at 442. R
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example, a mass murder that does not meet any of the three eviden-
tiary criteria.
The governing principle underlying the new law, however, is min-
imally rational: The conviction that makes one eligible for the death
penalty must have enhanced reliability.  That is, the conviction must be
supported by DNA evidence, a videotaped confession, or a vide-
orecording of the murder.  During the last twenty years, the prolifera-
tion of DNA-based exonerations in capital cases has demonstrated the
fallibility of our criminal justice system and has undermined the confi-
dence we once had in capital convictions.215  It was not irrational for
the General Assembly to respond to these miscarriages of justice by
requiring enhanced reliability for capital convictions.  That there may
be some cases in which more culpable murderers are not subject to
the death penalty does not render the new law unconstitutional.
These “more culpable” offenders are not similarly situated to those
murderers who are death-eligible in one sense: The capital convic-
tions in the former cases are not supported by the measures of en-
hanced reliability that support the death-eligible murderers.
The constitutionality of the new law may depend on what test a
court adopts to review it.  One test of constitutionality that the courts
have accepted is whether a capital statute is rational, not whether it is
narrowly tailored to accomplish a compelling governmental inter-
est.216  This standard has been criticized, but it is the test that some
courts have applied to uphold far-reaching capital laws.217
215. See MD. COMM’N ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, supra note 13, at 79–81 (noting “that the R
numerous exonerations and reversals in capital cases in recent years have led to a decline
in public support for the death penalty”).
216. See Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 181 (1988) (“[T]he States must channel the
[capital] sentencer’s discretion by clear and objective standards that provide specific and
detailed guidance and that make rationally reviewable the process for imposing a sentence
of death.” (alteration in original) (quoting Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 428 (1980))
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
217. Since 1976, in approving capital laws, courts have afforded substantial deference to
legislatures, and through them, to the will of the people.  Applying this deferential test,
sometimes explicitly and other times implicitly, the United States Supreme Court and the
Maryland Court of Appeals have rejected constitutional challenges to capital laws based on
the Eighth Amendment, see, e.g., Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 62–63 (2008) (rejecting an
Eighth Amendment challenge to lethal injection protocol); Grandison v. State, 390 Md.
412, 447, 889 A.2d 366, 386 (2005) (“It is entirely consistent with the Eighth Amendment’s
narrowing requirement to include accessories before the fact . . . within the class of those
eligible for the death penalty . . . .”), the Due Process Clause, see, e.g., Herrera v. Collins,
506 U.S. 390, 417–19 (1993) (rejecting a habeas corpus petitioner’s claim of actual inno-
cence on due process grounds); Grandison, 390 Md. at 438, 889 A.2d at 381 (“The issue of
whether [the Maryland death penalty statute] violates due process by permitting the jury to
find, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the aggravating factors found by the jury
outweigh the mitigating circumstances it finds to exist has been addressed and resolved by
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In Stephens, the court rejected the arbitrariness challenge, stating:
The new law heightens the standard of eligibility for the
death penalty.  As a result of these additional evidentiary
gateways, it may well be that the number of defendants
found guilty of murder in the first degree who are eligible
for the death penalty will be more limited.  If that were to
occur, it would be the result of the salutary purpose of the
amendment, which is to limit application of the death pen-
alty to cases in which the evidence of guilt is most reliable.  A
numerical decrease in the number of death-eligible defend-
ants does not create the randomness and arbitrariness pro-
hibited by post-Furman jurisprudence.
. . . .
Just as geographic and statistical disparities in the appli-
cation of Maryland’s death penalty statute do not make the
law arbitrary, statistical parity is not required by the Constitu-
tion.  All that is required is a system by which the jury is
guided in the exercise of its discretion by objective and ra-
tional standards.
Contrary to Defendant’s assertion, the amended statute
does not change the class of murders or murderers that are
subject to the death penalty.  The statute merely provides
that, within the class of otherwise death-eligible defendants,
only those whose guilt is supported by the most reliable evi-
dence will be subjected to the penalty.218
V. CONCLUSION
The Maryland Commission on Capital Punishment found that
the death penalty’s reinstatement in Maryland in 1978 has resulted in
this Court on numerous occasions . . . .  We have consistently determined that the weighing
process based on a preponderance of the evidence does not violate due process.” (citations
omitted)); Ryan Dietrich, Comment, A Unilateral Hope: Reliance on the Clemency Process as a
Trigger for a Right of Access to State-Held DNA Evidence, 62 MD L. REV. 1028, 1031–32 (2003),
and the Equal Protection Clause, see, e.g., McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 291–99 (1987)
(rejecting an equal protection challenge to the death penalty that was based on the statisti-
cal racial disparity in death penalty’s application); Evans v. State, 396 Md. 256, 325, 914
A.2d 25, 66 (2006) (“The courts accept the reasoning in McCleskey concerning the failure
of general statistics to establish a statewide Equal Protection or Cruel and Unusual Punish-
ment violation and instead require a defendant to assert some specific discriminatory in-
tent in their case.”). But see Ronald Kahn, Originalism, the Living Constitution, and Supreme
Court Decision Making in the Twenty-First Century: Explaining Lawrence v. Texas, 67 MD. L.
REV. 25, 27 n.15 (2007) (stating that McCleskey, in which the Court “fail[ed] to socially
construct a relationship between government institutions, race, and the death penalty,” is
“ripe for modification or even for overturning”).
218. State v. Stephens, No. K-08-646, slip op. at 7–8 (Md. Cir. Ct. Dec. 10, 2009) (foot-
note and citation omitted).
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failure and futility.  Specifically, there has been an extraordinarily
high error rate in capital cases in Maryland.  The Commission noted
that:
[T]here have been 353 death notices issued, 215 death no-
tice cases that went to trial and 77 death sentences issued. . .
[and] only . . . five executions.  Moreover, of the 77 death
sentences that have been issued, in addition to the five ex-
ecutions, there have been two commutations, three natural
deaths, and there are five individuals still on Death Row,
which leaves 62 death sentences that have been reversed.
Sixty-two reversals out of 77 sentences is an error rate of ap-
proximately eighty percent (80%).  Accordingly, the signifi-
cant expenditure of time and resources that the State of
Maryland has put into its capital punishment system has re-
sulted in only five executions and an error rate of eighty per-
cent (80%).219
The Commission found that if the resources dedicated to capital
prosecutions and to the direct and collateral appeals of these cases in
state and federal courts had been reallocated to homicide prevention
programs, many lives might have been saved.220  Programs across the
country, the Commission noted, have “closely monitor[ed] a limited
number of career criminals” and have “address[ed] the proliferation
of guns, threats to witnesses, child abuse and domestic violence, which
are the precursors to homicide.”221
The law that the General Assembly passed in 2009 addresses the
unacceptable risk that the high error rate in capital cases will result in
the execution of those who are factually innocent or those whose cul-
pability does not warrant the ultimate punishment.  It is a nationally
unique effort to substantially limit the reach of the death penalty,
while retaining it for those cases in which the evidence of capital mur-
der is compelling. It is a rational response to the record of failure of
capital punishment in Maryland.
219. MD. COMM’N ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, supra note 13, at 50 (emphasis omitted). R
220. See id. at 51.
221. Id.
